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COMMENTS

Civil Forfeiture and Innocent
Third Parties
INTRODUCTION

In recent years, government use of forfeiture' has accelerated
as law enforcement officials attempt to strike at racketeers and
drug offenders. Any property used in connection with criminal
acts presents an opportunity for the government to obtain a forfeiture.8 In fact, the use of forfeiture is so widespread that the management of acquired property is posing difficulties to law enforcement officials.' Recent acquisitions by the federal government from
the use of forfeiture include: part-ownership in six ranches, an oil
drilling company, a welding supply company, interests in three
Texas banks, a chain of western wear shops, and numerous planes,
trucks, vans, and yachts scattered across the United States.'
The forfeiture of property is authorized by statute s and, in
1. Forfeiture refers to the loss of property as a penalty for some illegal act.

(rev. 5th ed. 1979).
2. The government does not keep records on the value of items acquired by
forfeiture, but it does keep track of how much it sells. In 1981, civil forfeitures of
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 584

the proceeds of drug deals brought in $5 million dollars. This was more than the

government received from 1976 through 1979. Justice Department officials believe
that in 1982 the proceeds from civil forfeitures may approach $10 million dollars.
Nat'l L.J., Sept. 6, 1982, at 1, col. 5.
3. Forfeiture in the United States is allowed only pursuant to a statute in the
jurisdiction where the criminal act occurred. Therefore, whether the government
will actually be able to obtain a forfeiture depends upon the language of the statute. See infra note 6.
4. In recent years the vast amount of property acquired by the government
through the use of forfeiture has created an administrative nightmare for the Department "of Justice. In Florida, for example, the government has forfeited so
many yachts that they have run out of marina spaces to park them. Nat'l L.J.,
Sept. 5, 1982, at 1, col. 5.
5. Id.
6. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. §§ 781, 782, which provides in part:
§ 781. Unlawful use of vessels, vehicles, and aircrafts; contraband article
defined
(a) It shall be unlawful (1) to transport, carry, or convey any contraband
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general, the object of forfeiture is to punish the wrongdoer and deter future illegal behavior by imposing an economic penalty in addition to any criminal penalty.7 Forfeiture is also a means of gaining revenue to help compensate the government for its costs of law
enforcement.8 Forfeitures may be either criminal or civil in form.'
article in, upon, or by means of any vessel, vehicle, or aircraft; (2) to
conceal or possess any contraband article in or upon any vessel, vehicle,
or aircraft, or upon the person of anyone in or upon any vessel, vehicle,
or aircraft; or (3) to use any vessel, vehicle, or aircraft to facilitate the
transportation, carriage, conveyance, concealment, receipt, possession,
purchase, sale, birter, exchange, or giving away of any contraband
article.
(b) As used in this section, the term "contraband article" means
(1) Any narcotic drug which has been ...acquired or is possessed,
sold, transferred, or offered for sale, in violation of any laws of the
United States ... ; or

(2) Any firearm, with respect to which there has been committed
any violation of any provision of the National Firearms Act... ; or
(3) Any

. .

.counterfeit coin or obligation or other security of the

United States or any foreign government; or any material ...
used, in the making of. . .counterfeit coin or obligation or other
security; or
(4) Any cigarette, with respect to which there has been committed
any violation [of the laws of the United States].
§ 782. Seizure and forfeiture
Any vessel, vehicle, or aircraft which has been or is being used in violation of any provision of section 781 .. .shall be seized and forfeited:

Provided, .. [a provision is included which protects owners of common
carriers from forfeiture unless they were a consenting party to the illegal.
act. Also included is a provision protecting an owner from forfeiture if
his property was stolen from him before the illegal act took place].
49 U.S.C. §§ 781, 782 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
7. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1054, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939); S.REP. No. 926,
76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939); H.R. REP. No. 2751, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950); S.
REP. No. 1755, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950).
8. For example, in One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S.
232 (1972) the Court stated:
The

. .

.forfeiture is intended to aid in the enforcement of tariff regula-

tions. It prevents forbidden merchandise, from circulating in the United
States, and, by its monetary penalty, it provides a reasonable form of
liquidated damages for violation of the inspection provisions and serves
to reimburse the Government for investigation and enforcement expenses. In other contexts we have recognized that such purposes characterized remedial rather than punitive sanctions.
Id. at 237.
9. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). "[T]hough they [forfeiture
proceedings] may be civil in form, [they] are in their nature criminal." Id. at 634.
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Criminal forfeiture is an in personam ° proceeding and occurs
when there is a conviction against the property owner. 1 In contrast, civil forfeiture is an in rem 1 2 proceeding conducted solely
against the property used in connection with an illegal act. The
guilt or innocence of the property owner is not considered, and an
innocent owner can be deprived of his property when it is used by
another in connection with an illegal act. i"
Current federal and state civil forfeiture statutes that treat
property itself as a wrongdoer are extensions of archaic concepts. 4
In many cases these statutes serve to deprive totally innocent parties of their property without just compensation."
This comment seeks to examine the rights of innocent parties,
including property lienholders, whose property or interest is subSee generally Comment, Forfeitures-Civil or Criminal? 43 TEMP. L.Q. 191
(1970).
10. Against the person. Action seeking judgment against a person involving his personal rights and based on jurisdiction of his person, as distinguished from a judgment against property (i.e., in rem). Type of jurisdiction or power which a court may acquire over the defendant himself in
contrast to jurisdiction over his property.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 711 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
11. For instance, the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970-allows for the forfeiture of racketeering property owned by a defendant convicted under the Act.
18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). It is important to note that before
an in personam forfeiture can take place, the government must first obtain a conviction against the property owner. Id. at § 1963(c).
12. "A technical term used to designate proceedings or actions instituted
against the thing, in contradistinction to personal actions, which are said to be in

personam." BLACK'S

LAW DICTIONARY

713 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).

13. See, e.g., Dobbins Distillery v. United.States, 96 U.S. 395 (1878), where
the Court.stated:
Nothing can be plainer in legal decision than the proposition that the
offense therein defined is attached primarily to the [property] .

.

. used

in connection with the [offense], without-any regard whatsoever to the
personal misconduct or responsibility of the owner ....
Id. at 401.
14. "It [forfeiture] seems to have been originally designed, in the blind days
of popery, as an expiation for the souls of such as were snatched away by sudden
death; and for that purpose ought properly to have been given to the holy church
... [and] applied to purchase masses for the good of his soul." 1 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *300. See also infra note 26.
15. See, e.g., Calero-Toledo v; Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663
(1974), where an innocent -lessor's yacht was forfeited because the lessee was arrested for marijuana possession while on board the yacht. See infra note 108 and
accompanying text. Some forfeiture statutes may also serve to deprive innocent
lienholders of their security interests.
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ject to civil forfeiture because of its use in the commission of an
illegal act. The concept of forfeiture is examined from its historical
beginnings and early development in the United States, to current
forfeiture statutes and their application by the courts. Attention
has been given to the procedural and constitutional aspects of forfeiture, with regard to the rights of innocent persons. In addition,
this comment examines various statutory and constitutional defenses available to innocent parties, which may be used to prevent
forfeiture of their property.
HISTORY OF FORFEITURE

The origins of forfeiture have been traced to one of the Old
Testament laws which God gave to Moses: "If an ox gore a man or
woman, that they die then the ox shall be surely stoned, and his
flesh shall not be eaten; but the owner of the ox shall be quit."'
This Old Testament law reflected the view that "the instrument of
death was the accused and that religious expiation was required." 1
Fault was not a consideration. In a sense the animal was "strictly
liable" whenever it participated in the death of a person. 8 The
animal was considered a wrongdoer, hence the law was applied
only to the animal. 19 From this Old Testament law, together with
other pre-Christian traditions, 20 the concept of forfeiture was carried over into the early common law of England,'2 and became
16. Exodus 21:28 (King James).

17. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 681. See also O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON
7-8 (1981).
18. This rule of fault stated in Exodus 21:28 changed through the passage of
time, and eventually the owner was held strictly liable for the act committed by
his animal, but the owner could then be relieved of this liability by surrendering
the offending animal. See, e.g., 2 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 4647 (4th ed. 1936).
19. The verse in Exodus stating "the owner of the ox shall be quit" refers to
the Biblical restriction that the owner was not to be held liable. This restriction
on an owner's liability eventually evolved into holding the owner liable only if he
failed to give up the offending animal. Id. at 46.
LAW

20. The concept of forfeiture in the early common law was not strictly of

Biblical origin, but was probably also the result of influence from Anglo-Saxon
laws of "noxal surrender." Noxal surrender was the giving up of the property
which caused death or damage to the injured party or his family, not as restitution for the damage caused, but to discourage further action by the injured party.

Finkelstein, The Goring Ox: Some HistoricalPerspectives on Deodands, Forfeit-

ures, Wrongful Death, and the Western Notion of Sovereignty, 46 TEMP. L.Q.
169, 180-82 (1973).
21. O.W. HOLMES, supra note 17, at 24-26.
-
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known as "the institution of deodands.""
Deodands were objects, including immovable ones, that caused
the death of a human being. When the institution of deodands
was applied, the deodand objects themselves were not confiscated
but their value was assessed against the owner, and he was required to pay this amount to the King as a forfeiture."' The King
was then to redistribute the forfeited money to others, for the good
of the man's soul. Money was provided for masses to be said for
the deliverance of the dead man's soul, to provide relief to any survivors, and to aid in other charitable activities.2 5 Eventually, the
King ceased to apply the money forfeited to religious and charitable uses, and the deodand became another source of revenue to the
King. The justification for continuing with the institution
of deo26
dands was that it served as a penalty for carelessness.
The institution of deodands was brought as an in rem type of
proceeding.2 The object, not the person, was the guilty party. It
did not matter whether the person to whom the offending res 6 belonged was innocent of any wrongdoing. The value of the property
was forfeited to the King absolutely, and the owner could not re9
cover it.2

"22. The word "deodand" is derived from the Latin term deo dandum, which
is interpreted as a thing to be given to God. See 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 85 (7th ed. 1956); O.W. HOLMES, supra note 17, at 23-26; 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 473 (2nd ed. 1898); Finkelstein,
supra note 20, at 180 n.35.
23. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 473.
24. See id.; Finkelstein, supra note 20, at 185.
25. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 14, at *300.
26. It [forfeiture of the deodand] was said to reside in the praiseworthy
purpose of purchasing masses for the poor soul of the deceased which,
having "been hurried out of this world, outweighs the claim of the dead
man's kinfolk." But despite the fact that instances are recorded where
the deodand forfeiture was applied to charitable purposes by the church,
this too was soon given up, so that the deodand already at an early date
was little more than a source of revenue for whosoever had been designated as the public beneficiary.
Finkelstein, supra note 20, at 182 (quoting 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra
note 22, at 474).
27. See supra note 12 for a definition.
28. Derived from Latin and meaning in the civil law a thing or object. The
term has a wide and extensive significance including not only things which are
objects of property, but also things not capable of individual ownership. BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1172 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
29. "[A]ny animate or inanimate thing which caused the death of a human
being should be handed over to the king and devoted by his almoner to pious uses
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In August, 1846, the institution of deodands was formally
abolished, but the concept of forfeiting property involved in illegal
activity continued. In the same year, the Court of the Exchequer
decided Regina v. Woodrow.30 The case involved the seizure and
forfeiture of goods that were manufactured in a manner different
from what the law allowed. 1 The innocent purchaser had no
knowledge that the goods had been manufactured illegally. In its
holding, the court stated that the offending res could be forfeited
without regard to the owner's guilt or innocence.82 Hence, even
though the institution of deodands had been abolished, the concept of forfeiture had been expanded to include objects merely involved in criminal activity rather than just those causing death of
an individual.3 8
In addition to the forfeiting of a deodand, English law also
proyided for statutory and common law forfeitures. Common law
forfeitures were in personam actions, and resulted when a person
was convicted of a felony or treason.3 4 Upon conviction, the offender's real and personal property were forfeited to the King.3 5
The reason for these forfeitures was that a breach of the criminal
law was a breach of the' King's peace, and the commission of such a
grave offense justified forfeiting the offender's property."
In contrast, early English statutory forfeitures usually allowed
for the forfeiting of objects used in violation of customs and reve." 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 473.
30. 153 Eng. Rep. 907 (Ex. 1846).
31. The case involved the seizure by an excise officer of a quantity of tobacco
from a retailer, which was found to be adulterated with sugar, molasses, and other
saccharine matter. Forfeiture of the tobacco was sought because the law did not
allow the sale or manufacture of tobacco with additives. The retailer did not know
of the adulteration, which took place during the course of manufacture. Id. at
907-08.
32. Although the counsel conceded that the defendant retailer was "morally

innocent," id. at 910, the statutes still allowed for forfeiture, even in circumstances where there was no intention of fraud. Id. at 912.
33. See generally Finkelstein, supra note 20, at 198-203.
34. See 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 22, at 68-71; 2 F. POLLOCK & F.
MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 473-74.
35. The convicted felon forfeited his chattels to the Crown and his lands escheated to his lord; the convicted traitor forfeited all of his property, real and
personal, to the Crown. 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 22, at 68-71; 2 F. POLLOCK
& F. MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 473-74.
36. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 14, at *299. In 1870, England eliminated
most forfeitures of those convicted of felonies or treason.
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nue laws.37 These statutory forfeitures were in rem proceedings,
brought against the property itself."8 They were used to further
punish the wrongdoer by depriving him of his property."9 Statutory.
forfeitures are essentially different from common law forfeitures
which arose upon the conviction of a defendant, in that the personal guilt of the owner is immaterial and only the wrongful use of
the object is considered by the court.40
These three types of English forfeiture-the institution of deodands, common law forfeiture of a felon's property, and statutory
forfeiture-were used as the basis for the forfeiture statutes enacted in the United States.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF FORFEITURE IN THE UNITED STATES

Forfeiture laws' in the early United States were applied in the
same manner as in England; the forfeiture proceeding was applied
strictly against the property involved in criminal activity. Even if
the owner of the property could prove •that he was totally innocent
of any wrongdoing, the property would still be forfeited.
The first case in the United States to consider the civil forfeiture of property used in the commission of the crime was The Palmyra,4 1 decided in 1827. The Palmyra was a ship that had allegedly engaged in acts of piracy on the high seas.42 Pursuant to a
statute enacted by Congress, 43 a forfeiture proceeding was brought
37. Statutory forfeitures were likely a product of the confluence and merger
of the deodand tradition and the belief that the right to own property could be
denied to the wrongdoer. See generally id. at *261-62.
38. Id.
39. Statutory forfeitures were most often enforced under the in rem procedure utilized in the Court of Exchequer to forfeit the property of felons. Id. at
*261-62.
40. Id.
41. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827).
42. The Palmyra, a ship acting under a commission from the King of Spain,
was captured by the United States after being accused of engaging in acts of
piracy against two United States vessels. Id. at 2.
43. The statute stated in part:
[T]hat whenever any vessel or boat, from which any piratical aggression,
search, restraint, depredation or seizure shall have been first attempted
or made, shall be captured and brought into any port of the United
States, the same shall and may be adjudged and condemned to their use,
and that-of the captors, after due process and trial, in- any court having
admiralty jurisdiction, and which shall be holden for the district into
which such captured vessel shall be brought; and the same court shall
thereupon order a sale and distribution thereof accordingly, and at their
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against the ship. Counsel for the owners of the ship argued that it
could not be forfeited unless the court first determined that the
owner of the Palmyra had been guilty of an offense."' The Court
rejected this contention and stated that forfeiture was an in rem
proceeding directed solely against the property.4 ' The guilt or innocence of the ship's owner was not relevant, because the ship itself was the offending party.
In 1844, the United States Supreme Court reviewed United
States v. Brig Malek Adhel,4" another case involving the forfeiture

of a pirate ship. In this case the innocence of the ship's owner was

fully established, but the Court adhered to its holding in The Palmyra, stating that the ship was to be treated as the offender without regard to the owner's conduct.'"
Another early United States case applied a forfeiture statute
to real property. In Dobbin's Distillery v. United States," the

owner of a building leased to a distiller had his building forfeited
because the lessee, with intent to avoid paying the proper revenue
tax, failed to maintain the business records required by law. 9 The
lessor had no knowledge of the lessee's unlawful conduct, and there
discretion.

Act of March 3, 1819, ch. 77, 3 Stat. 510 (1846).
44. The defense argued that the charging instrument was defective because it
failed to include the allegation that there was a previous prosecution and conviction of the captured persons for the crime of piracy. The defense insisted that this
was an essential prerequisite to the proceeding in rem. The Palmyra,25 U.S. at 7.
45. Id. at 13-14. The Court stated:
Many cases exist where there is both a forfeiture in rem and a personal
penalty. But in neither class of cases has it ever been decided that the
prosecutions were dependent upon each other. But the practice has been,
and so this Court understand[s] the law to be, that the proceeding in
rem stands independent of, and wholly unaffected by any criminal proceeding in personam.
Id. at 14-15 (italics in original).
46. 43 U.S. (2 How.) 209 (1844).
47. The Court stated: "The vessel which commits the aggression is treated as
the offender, as the guilty instrument or thing to which the forfeiture attaches,
without any reference whatsoever to the character or conduct of the owner." Id.
at 233.
48. 96 U.S. 395 (1878).
49. Act of July 20, 1868, ch. 186, § 19, 15 Stat. 125 (1869) required the lessee,
occupant and operator of a distillery to keep accurate records of the volume of
spirits distilled, so that tax may be assessed and collected. The Act also provided
that if accurate records were not kept, the real and personal property of the distillery could be forfeited to the United States. (Current version at 26 U.S.C. § 5688
(1976)).
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was no way he could have known.50 However, the fiction adopted in

The Palmyra, that the property was the wrongdoer, was again relied upon by the Court and forfeiture of the lessor's building was
allowed. 5
In addition to the federal statutes allowing for the forfeiture of
property used in the commission of an offense, state legislatures
also enacted similar statutes allowing for forfeiture under state
law.0" The number of forfeiture statutes continued to increase on
both the state and federal level. Today these statutes reach virtually any type of property that might be used in connection with
criminal activity.58 Despite this proliferation of forfeiture laws, the
to forfeiture had been
innocence of the owner of property subject
54
defense.
a
as
rejected
almost uniformly
STATUTORY PROCEDURES IN FORFEITURE PROCEEDINGS

In the United States, forfeiture proceedings are commenced
pursuant to a statute. The statutes are classified as either civil or
criminal, and due to their penal nature have been strictly construed by the courts. 0 Those statutes that require a finding of
guilt on the part of the property owner before forfeiture proceedings could attach are criminal in nature, and require that the proceeding be brought in personam." In contrast, statutes which are
50. 96 U.S. at 397.
51. See supra note 13.
52. See generally C.J. Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U.S. 133, 134-53 (1943),
where the Court examined the historical development of forfeiture in the United
States.
53. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 20-2-93 (Supp. 1982), which provides for the forfeiture of all property used in connection with the manufacture and distribution of
controlled substances. See also supra note 6.
54. However, the innocent party whose property is subject to forfeiture is not
totally without any remedy. In most jurisdictions procedures are available to the
innocent party so that he may avoid forfeiture. See infra notes 134-37 and accompanying text.
55. See United States v. Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. 210 (1844) and Dobbin's
Distillery,96 U.S. 395 (1877), where the Court adhered strictly to the language of
the statute in upholding the forfeiture. See supra notes 47, 51. Strict construction
reflects a policy of fairness; someone should not be held criminally accountable for
conduct that he could not reasonably know was illegal. Dunn v. United States,
442 U.S. 100, 112 (1979).
56. See, e.g., Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, tit. IX, 18 U.S.C. §§ 19611968 (commonly known as RICO). This federal statute provides for in personam
forfeitures as one of the penalties for violating the Act. Since the focus of this
comment is upon the rights of innocent persons whose property is subject to civil
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directed solely against the offending property without regard to
the culpability of the owner are classified as civil, and the proceeding is brought in rem." In a criminal forfeiture the guilt of the
owner is a prerequisite to forfeiture, but in a civil proceeding it is
not. As a result, an innocent person whose property is used by another in the commission of an offense may find that his property is
subject to civil forfeiture.5 8 Most forfeiture cases deal with personal property such as automobiles, boats, airplanes, and other
means of transporting and concealing contraband; however, real
property can also be forfeited if the statute specifically includes
real property.5 9
The civil forfeiture procedure begins when a person in possession of property subject to statutory forfeiture, commits an offense.60 If the law enforcement agency within the jurisdiction has
probable cause to believe that the property is subject to forfeiture,
it may seize and retain the property pending a judicial determination of the validity of the forfeiture."1 "Probable cause" as used in
forfeiture proceedings is the same standard employed to test
searches and seizures generally6 2 - that is - whether at the moment of seizure, the facts and circumstances within the seizing offorfeitures, an analysis of criminal forfeitures has not been included. For an analysis of criminal forfeitures, see Taylor, Forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. §
1963-RICO's Most Powerful Weapon, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 379 (1980); Weiner,
Crime Must Not Pay: RICO Criminal Forfeiture in Perspective; 1 N. ILL. U.L.
REV. 225 (1981); Comment, RICO Forfeitures and the Rights of Innocent Third
Parties, 18 CAL. W.L. REV. 345 (1982); Note, RICO's Enforcement Provisions: An
Interpretative Analysis, 15 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 941 (1981).
57. In Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 511 (1921), the
Court stated that the "thing is primarily considered the offender."
58. See, e.g., Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. 663. The lessor of a yacht had his property forfeited because the lessee was arrested on board the yacht for possession of
a marijuana cigarette. See the discussion beginning infra at note 108 and accom-

panying text.
59. Dobbin's Distillery, 96 U.S. 395.
60. The wrongful use of property subjects it to a possible forfeiture. Before
property can be forfeited it must have been used in connection with the illegal
act. See generally Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. 663.
61. See Kandaras, Due Process and Federal Property Forfeiture Statutes:.
The Need of Immediate Post-Seizure Hearing, 34 Sw. L.J. 925, 926 (1980).
62. In United States v. One 1975 Mercedes 280S, 590 F.2d 196 (6th Cir.
1978), the court stated that "probable cause" in a forfeiture proceeding is not a
special term of art, but is the same standard employed to test searches and
seizures generally. Id. at 199 (citing United States v. One Twin Engine Beech
Airplane, 533 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1976)).

[1983:323]

FORFEITURE AND INNOCENT PARTIES

ficer's knowledge, and of which he had reasonably trustworthy information, were sufficient to warrant the belief in a prudent person
that the property was involved in the commission of an offense."'
The property owner is not given any notice prior to the
seizure,"4 and most statutes do not allow for an immediate postseizure hearing." The owner's sole remedy is to await the outcome
of the judicial forfeiture proceeding." In addition, forfeiture statutes generally do not require that judicial proceedings be instigated within a specified period of time and, as a result, the owner
of property seized by mistake can be needlessly deprived of the
property while the judicial proceeding is delayed."7 However, some
states do allow for the return of seized property to the owner who
posts a security bond equal to the value of the property forfeited."
After the property is seized, the investigating officer submits a
report of the seizure to the prosecutor in that jurisdiction.69 The
prosecutor determines whether the forfeiture claim is meritorious.
If the claim is meritorious, an in rem civil suit is filed, naming the
property itself as the defendant. 70 The action then proceeds like
63. See Beck v. State of Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1974), where the constitutional standard of probable cause is set forth.
64. Probable cause as established by the seizing officer is sufficient to permit
a seizure. But see, e.g., State of Washington v. One 1972 Mercury Capri, 85 Wash.
2d 620, 537 P.2d 763 (1975), where the court held that notice and a hearing must
be provided to the owner either before or immediately after the seizure of the
property.
65. See Kandarus, supra note 61, at 926-29.
66. However, if the government fails to instigate forfeiture within a reasonable period of time, the right to forfeiture may be barred. See infra notes 151-56
and accompanying text.
67. Kandarus, supra note 61, at 926-29.
68. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 50-11-2100 (Law. Co-op. 1976), which provides
in part:

But when the vehicle, boat or animal is of greater value than one thousand dollars, the owner thereof may at anytime before the sale redeem it
by paying to the Director for deposit as aforesaid the sum of one thousand dollars therefor.
See also Moore v. Timmerman, 276 S.E.2d 290 (S.C. 1981), for application of the
above quoted statute. .
69. See,-e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 1603 (1976 & Supp. V 1981), which requires a customs officer to report to the United States Attorney whenever a seizure takes
place, and to submit a report containing a statement of all facts and circumstances surrounding the seizure. See also Kandarus, supra note 61, at 927.
70. This is because the proceeding is "inrem," directed solely at the property
as the offender. The description of the property is named in the information or
indictment, and all proceedings are directed at the property. Individuals with an
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any ordinary civil claim. The parties are usually able to take advantage of all civil procedural trial rights available in the jurisdiction where the forfeiture is sought, including discovery and trial by
jury."1 However, because the property is technically forfeited upon
the commission of an offense, the trial is usually characterized as
an action to perfect title in the government."2
Although the claim is civil in form, the Supreme Court has
held that a forfeiture proceeding is criminal for fourth and fifth
amendment purposes. Property owners in such actions can properly assert their fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and their fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. 8
The forfeiture trial focuses on whether a criminal offense has
interest in the property sought to be forfeited are allowed to intervene in the
proceedings. See generally Comment, Forfeiture Seizures and the Warrant Requirement, 48 U. CHi. L. REv. 960 (1981).
71. In Commonwealth v. One 1972 Chevrolet Van, 385 Mass. 198, 431 N.E.2d
209 (1982), an action for forfeiture was brought against a van used in connection
with the unlawful distribution of controlled substances. The owner appealed the
forfeiture arguing that he was denied the right to a jury trial. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that a jury trial was required, stating:
Forfeiture of a common vehicle is unlike forfeiture of either (a) items
such as drugs, which are the subject matter of the crime itself, or (b)
items, such as stills and certain burglary tools, which are special instruments tailored to the commission of crimes. The van here had no distinguishing quality that made it particularly suitable for use in committing
crimes, and its ownership, possession, and use were not crimes themselves. Where a mass-produced object as common as a motor vehicle is
involved, the element of punishment certainly becomes dominant, and
the preventative [sic] quality of forfeiture becomes relatively insignificant, and often nonexistent, so as to make the forfeiture a deprivation of
property within the meaning of [the state's constitution]. Therefore, a
jury trial must be made available in a vehicle forfeiture proceeding under
[the forfeiture statute].
431 N.E.2d at 211. See also C.J. Hendry v. Moore, 318 U.S. 133 (1943); United
States v. One 1976 Mercedes Benz 280S, 618 F.2d 453 (7th Cir. 1980).
72. In United States v. Mills, 440 F.2d 647 (6th Cir. 1971), the court stated
that the property used illegally becomes legally forfeited at the time of its wrongful use even though it is not seized until later. Id. at 648.
73. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). In Boyd, the United States
sought to compel the property owner to submit evidence in a forfeiture proceeding, and if the owner did not produce the evidence, the allegations of the government were taken as being confessed. The Court held that in a forfeiture proceeding, the owner was constitutionally permitted to invoke his fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination and his fourth amendment privilege against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
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in fact occurred, and on the seized property's involvement in the
commission of the offense.7 4 The government has the initial burden
of demonstrating the existence of probable cause for the seizure
and forfeiture within the meaning of the statute in question.7 5 The
government must only prove that there .was probable cause; it does
not.have to establish a prima facie case. 70 After the government
meets the requirement of showing probable cause, the burden then
shifts to the property owner, who must rebut the showing of probable cause and demonstrate that the property was not used in violation of the statute. 77 Acquittal of a criminal defendant, or the innocence and good faith of the property's owner do not mandate
78
return of the property.
74. See -generallyComment, supra note 70, at 973-90.
75. See infra note 77.
76. In Ted's Motors v.'United States, 217 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1954), the court
stated: "The necessity of showing probable cause in justification of seizures on
land or sea has led to various definitions of the phrase. It is safe to say that it
means less than prima facie legal proof and no more than 'a reasonable ground for
belief in guilt.'" Id. at 780.
77. In One 1975 Mercedes 280S, the court held:
While we cannot agree with the government's insistance [sic] that probable cause is all that is needed by way of proof to justify a forfeiture even
in the face of overwhelming proof that the cause, though probable, was
not ultimately sustained, it is apparent to us that a showing of probable
cause is sufficient to warrant a forfeiture and that summary judgment
was properly entered in the absence of any exercise by the claimant of
her right to come forward and show that the facts constituting probable
cause did not actually exist.
590 F.2d at 199.
78. In One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232 (1972), a
jewelry dealer entered the United States without declaring some jewelry in his
possession. He was indicted, tried, and acquitted of all criminal charges. Thereafter, the United States instituted forfeiture proceedings directed at the smuggled
jewelry. The forfeiture was allowed, and the owner appealed, arguing that (1) collateral estoppel. barred the forfeiture, and (2) the double jeopardy clause of the
fifth amendment barred the forfeiture. The Court held that a criminal acquittal
does not constitute an adjudication on the preponderance-of-the-evidence burden
applicable in civil proceedings, and that the criminal acquittal may have been
based on lack of criminal intent, which is not required for forfeiture. For a discussion of the owner's double jeopardy argument and the Court's holding, see infra
note 126 and accompanying text.
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FORFEITURE AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

A.

ContrabandPer Se and Derivative Contraband

When considering the constitutional aspects of forfeiture, a
determination must be made as to whether one can claim a protected property interest 9 in the item seized. Property subject to
civil forfeiture is classified as being either contraband per se, or
derivative contraband.80 In general, contraband per se is defined as
any property which, because of its unlawful nature, is illegal to
possess."1 The owner of contraband per se has no protected interest in the property seized.8 2 There is a complete absence of property rights in such property, and the government can seize and destroy it at will. 8 The return of contraband per se to its owner is
against public policy, even it it is seized illegally.' 4 Since it is illegal
to possess contraband per se, civil forfeiture statutes apply only to
property that would otherwise belong to its nominal owner. 65
Derivative contraband is property that has social utility, but is
classified as contraband solely because it was involved in criminal
activity.8 It is subject to seizure and forfeiture by virtue of its con79. A protected property interest can be claimed only in those items that are
legal to possess. Property rights are not recognized in items such as counterfeit
money or marijuana, because the mere possession of these types of items-known
as contraband per se-is against public policy. Therefore, even if the owner can
prove that the items were seized illegally, they will not be returned unless he
could also show that return of the items would not frustrate public policy against
the possession of such objects. See One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania,
380 U.S. 693 (1965). See also United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951).
80. Contraband per se-for example, illegal narcotics or weapons-can be
seized and forfeited without formal judicial proceedings, since by nature its possession is illegal. In contrast, derivative contraband-for example, a car or boat
used in connection with a criminal act--is considered contraband only by virtue
of its illegal use. Possession in itself of these items is not illegal. See Comment,
supra note 70, at 990.
81. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 291 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
82. Contraband per se is considered dangerous to society, and its mere possession is illegal. See supra note 80.
83. No formal hearing is necessary, since the former owner cannot claim a
protected property interest in contraband per se. See supra note 79.
84. In United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951), the Court stated that although the evidence was seized illegally from the defendant, and therefore would
be suppressed as evidence at the trial, the property would not be returned to him
since it was classified as contraband per se. Id. at 54.
85. See generally Comment, supra note 70.
86. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan, 380 U.S. at 699.
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nection with illegal activity rather than its illegal nature.8 s Because
the mere possession of derivative contraband is not illegal, it retains its character as property for which the persons with legally
cognizable possessory interests can claim due process protection.
B. Forfeiture and Due Process of Law
The United States Constitution declares that neither the state
nor federal government may deprive an individual of his property
without due process of law,88 and that property cannot be taken by
the government without providing the owner just compensation.8s
These constitutional limitations were examined by the United
States Supreme Court in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing
Company." This is perhaps the most important forfeiture case examining the rights of innocent parties whose property has been
forfeited because the property was used by another in the commission of a criminal offense.
In Calero-Toledo, Pearson, a lessor of pleasure yachts, found
that the Puerto Rican government had seized his property after
agents had arrested a lessee of the yacht for possession of marijuana.' 1 The forfeiture was conducted pursuant to a Puerto Rican
statute" which did not allow any redress to an innocent owner.
87. Id.

88. U.S. CONST. amend. V provides: "No person shall ... be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV provides in part:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.
89. U.S. CONST. amend. V.

90. 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
91. Id. The yacht had not been used in smuggling drugs, and, as far as the
Court could determine, only one marijuana cigarette was found on the yacht. Id.
at 693 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
92. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 24, § 2512(a)(4) (1979) provides:
(a) The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico:
(1) All controlled substances which have been manufactured, distributed,
dispensed, or acquired in violation of this chapter, ..
(4) All conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, mount or vessels, which
are used, or are intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facili-
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Notice of the seizure was given to the lessee, who neither notified
the owner nor challenged the seizure. By the time Pearson learned
that his $19,8003 yacht had been seized, it had already been forfeited, and was the property of the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico.94
The owner based his appeal of the yacht's forfeiture upon two
constitutional issues: first, that the seizure of the yacht was undertaken without notice and the opportunity for a prompt hearing,
denying him his constitutional right to due process of law; and second, that the forfeiture statute as applied to an innocent person
amounted to a deprivation of property without just compensation. 5
1. Procedural Due Process
In support of his procedural due process argument, the owner
replied upon the decision in Fuentes v. Shevin" which held that
statutory replevin authorizing seizure of property without prior notice or hearing deprived debtors of their property without due process of law.97 However, the Court in Calero-Toledo refused to extate the transportation, sale, receipt, possession, or concealment of property described in clauses (1) and (2) of this subsection ....
93. The parties agreed that the yacht was appraised at a value of $19,800.
416 U.S. at 668 n.4.
94. It was not until Pearson attempted to repossess the yacht from the lessees, because of their failure to pay rent, that he became aware of the seizure and
subsequent forfeiture of his yacht. At trial, the Puerto Rican government conceded that Pearson was "in no way ...

involved in the criminal enterprise car-

ried on by [the] lessee" and that he "had no knowledge that its property was
being used in connection with or in violation of [Puerto Rican law]." Id. at 668.
95. Id.
96. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
97. Fuentes involved the validity of Florida and Pennsylvania replevin statutes permitting creditors to seize goods allegedly wrongfully detained. A writ of
replevin could be obtained under the Florida statute upon the creditor's bare assertion to a court clerk that he was entitled to the property, and under the Pennsylvania statute, upon filing an affidavit .fixing the value of the property, without
alleging legal entitlement to the property. Fuentes held that the statutory procedures deprived debtors of their property without due process of law by failing to
"provide for hearings at a meaningful time." Id. at 80.
Pearson's argument in Calero-Toledo was that since he was not provided
with notice and the opportunity for a hearing prior to the seizure of his yacht, the
forfeiture was constitutionally defective in light of the Supreme Court's decision
in Fuentes. 416 U.S. at 668.
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tend the Fuentes decision to forfeiture cases.98 The Court stated
that under Fuentes, immediate seizure of property without a prior
hearing may be constitutionally permissible in limited circumstances: first, if the seizure was directly necessary to secure an important governmental or general public interest; second, where
there has been a special need for very prompt action; and third,
where the State has kept strict control over its monopoly of legitimate force. 9 In each of these circumstances, the person initiating
the seizure must be a government official responsible for determining, under the standards of a narrowly drawn statute, that immediate seizure is necessary and justified in the particular instance. 100
The Calero-Toledo Court then went on to hold that seizure pursuant to a forfeiture statute presented an extraordinary situation in
which postponement of notice and hearing until after seizure did
not deny due process. 101
It should be noted that the procedural issue considered by the
court in Calero-Toledo was whether due process required a preseizure hearing. Tlie Court considered neither the sufficiency of the
post-seizure process, nor whether an immediate post-seizure hearing was required.0 2
2. Substantive Due Process: Taking Without Compensation
The second part of the owner's argument in Calero-Toledo
98. The Court noted that in certain "extraordinary" situations the requirement of notice and a hearing prior to seizure would not deny due process. 416
U.S. 678-79.
99. The Calero-Toledo Court cited the following as examples of "limited circumstances" in which property could be constitutionally seized prior to notice
and a hearing: "to protect the public from contaminated food, . . . from a bank
failure, .. from misbranded drugs,. . .to aid the collection taxes, .. or to aid

the war effort." Id. at 679.
100. Immediate seizure was justified in this situation, the Court stated, be-

cause pre-seizure notice and a hearing might allow the owner of the property to
remove it from the jurisdiction. Id.

101. Id. at 680.

102. Pearson was also not provided with notice immediately after the yacht

was seized. In fact, he was never personally notified of the seizure by the Puerto
Rican government. Pearson possibly could have argued that the failure of the government to provide him with a post-seizure hearing deprived him of his property
without due process of law. However, since Pearson did not raise this issue on
appeal, the requirement of a post-seizure hearing was not examined by the Court.
For additional information on whether a post-seizure hearing is constitutionally
required in a forfeiture proceedings, see generally Kandaras, supra note 61, at

929-31.
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was that the taking of his property without just compensation was

unconstitutional based upon an earlier decision by the Court in
United States v. United States Coin and Currency.10 3
The owner argued that the Court's statement in Coin and
Currency-that civil forfeiture statutes are intended to impose a
penalty only upon those who are significantly involved in criminal
behavior-effectively overruled prior court decisions that the owner's innocence would not be a defense to forfeiture.1 0 4 The CaleroToledo Court rejected this argument, holding instead that the forfeiture proceeding did not constitute an unconstitutional taking of
Pearson's yacht. The Court found that a legitimate government
purpose was served by the Puerto Rican forfeiture statute 0 5 and
noted that sufficient punitive and deterrent goals were achieved by

preventing further illicit use of the property, and by making illegal

behavior unprofitable by imposing an economic penalty. 10 6 In addition, the Court reasoned that application of forfeiture procedures
to innocent persons may have the desirable effect of inducing them
to exercise greater care in transferring possession of their property
10 7
to others.
103. 401 U.S. 715 (1971).
104. In Coin and Currency, a gambler was convicted in a criminal proceeding
for failure to register as a gambler and failure to pay a gambling tax as required
by law. The United States then instituted forfeiture proceedings to obtain the
money found in the defendant's possession at the time of his arrest. The government claimed that the privilege against self-incrimination could not be asserted in
a forfeiture proceeding because the proceeding was not "criminal." The court held
that forfeiture statutes "manifested a clear intention to impose a penalty only
upon those who [were] significantly involved in a criminal enterprise." Id. at 72122.
105. In rejecting the owner's argument, the Court stated that the decision in
Coin and Currency merely allowed an owner to assert his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination in a forfeiture proceeding. The Calero-Toledo
Court then held: "Thus, Coin and Currency did not overrule prior decisions that
sustained application to innocents of forfeiture statutes, like the Puerto Rican
statutes, not limited in application to persons 'significantly involved in a criminal
enterprise.'" 416 U.S. at 688. "Plainly, the Puerto Rican forfeiture statutes further the punitive and deterrent purposes that have been found sufficient to uphold, against constitutional challenge, the application of other forfeiture statutes
to the property of innocents." Id. at 686.
106. The forfeiture of conveyances prevent them from being used again in
violation of narcotics laws. Id. at 687.
107. "To the extent that such forfeiture provisions are applied to lessors,
bailors, or secured creditors who are innocent of any wrongdoing, confiscation
may have the desirable effect of inducing them to exercise greater care in transferring possession of their property." Id. at 689.
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The Court did, however, note two circumstances in which it
would be difficult to conclude that forfeiture served legitimate purposes and was not unduly oppressive. First are those forfeiture
cases concerning property obtained by the wrongdoer without the
owner's consent; and second are those situations where an owner
not only could prove that he was unaware of the wrongful activity,
but also could establish that he had done all that reasonably could
be expected to prevent the illegal use of his property. 10 8 Based on
the facts in this case, the Calero-Toledo Court stated that Pearson
voluntarily entrusted the lessees with possession of the yacht and
had failed to prove that he did all that he reasonably could do to
avoid having the yacht used illegally. 109 The forfeiture was sustained, and Pearson, who was innocent of any wrongdoing, lost his
$19,800 yacht.
As a result of the decision in Calero-Toledo, the legal fiction
that property can in some manner be guilty of wrongdoing has continued from the ancient laws of deodands to present day forfeiture
statutes.110 The harsh rule of forfeiture operates against innocent
parties in many situations: an owner who lends his automobile to
another who uses it illegally, 1 a lender whose security interest in
a van is forfeited because the owner conceals drugs in it,112 or a
subsequent owner whose property is seized because it was used illegally by a previous owner. 8
Although the Supreme Court's decision in Calero-Toledo still
allows for the forfeiture of an innocent person's property, one significant aspect of the decision was that it does leave the door open
for future due process challenges by innocent owners. However, it
108. Id.
109. The Court made this finding in spite of the fact that the Government of
Puerto Rico conceded that Pearson did not have any knowledge of the criminal
enterprise carried on by the lessee and did not have any knowledge that the yacht
was being used in violation of the law. It is interesting to note that Pearson's lease
agreement contained a clause prohibiting the use of the yacht for any unlawful
project. Id. at 693 (Douglas, J., dissenting). See also supra note 94.
110. See supra note 23 and accompanying text for a discussion of the law of
deodands.
111. Lindsay v. Cincinnati, 172 Ohio St. 137, 174 N.E.2d 96 (1961).
112. Commonwealth v. One 1978 Ford Van, 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh.
880, 419 N.E.2d 1060 (1981). See infra note 170 and accompanying text. See also
United States v. One 1967 Cadillac Coupe Eldorado, 415 F.2d 647 (9th Cir. 1969);
United States v. One 1961 Cadillac, 337 F.2d 730 (6th Cir. 1964).
113. United States v. One 1976 Chevrolet Corvette, 477 F. Supp. 32 (E.D. Pa.
1979). See infra notes 164-68 and accompanying text.
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should be noted that the two circumstances in which the Supreme
Court stated innocent owners might be able to avoid forfeiture
were dicta and not part of the holding. In addition, even if a subsequent court were persuaded to allow the exceptions, the innocent
owner would be 'faced with the task of proving he did all that he
reasonably Could to prevent the illegal use of his property.
C. Forfeiture Based on Evidence Illegally Seized
Given the harshness of forfeiture statutes, it appears that the
courts are reluctant to give the government. the additional advantage of using illegally obtained evidence in such proceedings. In
One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania,,"' the Supreme Court
addressed the issue of whether evidence seized illegally by the government may still be used to sustain a civil forfeiture. The Court
held that if evidence were seized without probable cause, the exclusionary rule would bar the use of the illegally seized evidence in
a forfeiture proceeding." 5
While this decision gave an owner the opportunity to assert a
violation of his fourth amendment right prohibiting illegal searches
and seizures, it left unresolved the question of whether a property
6
owner could exclude evidence illegally seized from another.' 1 In
1
United States v. One 1976 Cadillac Seville, a federal district
114. 380 U.S. 693 (1965). In this case, the arresting officers stopped and
searched a car that appeared to be "low in the rear." The officer's search of the
car was conducted without a search or arrest warrant. At the forfeiture hearing,
the owner sought dismissal of the forfeiture petition on the ground that the evidence to be used in the forfeiture proceeding was illegally obtained. Id. at 694.
See also United States v. $38,394 United States Currency, 498 F. Supp. 1325
(N.D. Ill. 1980), where the government sought to forfeit the same property it illegally seized. In holding that the forfeiture would not be allowed, the court stated:
This Court will not permit the government to take advantage of its own
illegal conduct to forfeit a citizen's property, nor to bootstrap itself by
the return and prompt reseizure of the property (whose present location
it would have no knowledge of but for its own unlawful conduct in the
initial seizure).
Id. at 1327.
115. The Court held that the exclusionary rule as set forth in Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961), which stated that evidence seized illegally Was constitutionally barred from use as evidence in a criminal trial, also barred its use as evidence
in a forfeiture proceeding. 380 U.S. at 695.
116. The Court in One 1958 Plymouth specifically referred to "the right of
the owner of the goods to assert as a defense violations of his constitutional
rights." 380 U.S. at 701 n.11 (emphasis added).
117. 477 F. Supp. 879 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
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court extended the Plymouth Sedan decision and excluded evi-.
dence seized illegally from someone other than the owner of the
property sought to be forfeiied. 118 However,, the holdings in two
recent Supreme Court cases indicate a contrary view. In Rakas V.
Illinois"' and United States v. Salvucci,12 0 the Court has held that
a person can claim the benefits of the exclusionary rule only if his
own fourth amendment rights have been-violated 1

21

1

Mere owner-

ship of the thing seized does not confer standing to challenge the
legality of the seizure. Therefore, it appears that the district court
decision in UnitedStates v. One 1976 Cadillac Seville is no longer
cannot
valid, 2 and in a forfeiture proceeding the property owner
1 23
another.
from
seized
illegally
seek to exclude evidence
118. In One 1976 Cadillac Seville, the government sought to forfeit a car by
using evidence it had seized illegally from a passenger. The court refused to allow
the forfeiture stating that accidents of ownership should not determine fourth
amendment rights, 'especially in a proceeding where the vehicle, and not its owner, is. the named defendant. If 'the forfeiture were' upheld under these circumstances, any owner could have his vehicle forfeited simply because a passenger in
the vehicle had marijuana in his pocket. 477 F. Supp. 882, 884.
119. 439 U.S. 128 (1978), reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 1122 (1979).
120. 448 U.S. 83 (1980).
121. The "automatic standing" rule of Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257
(1960), that solely by virtue of his presence during the search, the defendant had
"standing" to object to that search, was overruled by the Court's decision in
Salvucci. After Salvucci, a defendant must show that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searched before he can avail himself of the benefits of
the exclusionary rule.
122. In its opinion, the court determined, that the vehicle itself had standing
to object to the illegal seizure of evidence from a person entering the vehicle. 477
F. Supp. at 884.
Although the court cited Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, its holding is contradictory to Rakas, especially in light of the court's closing comments:
It should make no difference who the vehicle's owner is or whether the
evidence was seized from the vehicle itself, from a passenger riding in the
vehicle, or (as here) from a passenger entering the vehicle. The government should not be allowed to exploit its unlawful behavior and base its
action on illegally seized evidence.
477 F. Supp. at 885.
In a sense, the court in One 1976 Cadillac Seville gave a forfeited vehicle
"automatic standing," a doctrine specifically overruled by Rakas and Salvucci.
See supra -note 121.
123. Although a specific case could not be found to support this contention,
an extention of the holdings in Rakas and Salvucci to a forfeiture proceeding
indicates that this would be the probable result.
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D. Double Jeopardy and Forfeiture
The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment1 4 does not
preclude the possibility of forfeiture occurring subsequent to a
criminal proceeding. In One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United
States,125 the Supreme Court held that both a criminal penalty
and a civil penalty may be imposed with respect to the same act or
omission, because the double jeopardy clause prohibits only punishing a person twice for the same offense.1ss Despite its quasicriminal character, forfeiture is not a second criminal proceeding,
but is instead a civil proceeding directed at the property itself.'
In addition, the government is not collaterally estopped 28 from litigating a second time the same issues as in the prior criminal proceeding.' 2 This is because the government is charged with a different standard of proof in the two proceedings. 30 As a result,
124. U.S. CONST. amend. V states in part: "[Nlor shall any person be subject
for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law .
125. 409 U.S. 232 (1972). See supra note 78.
126. In coming to this conclusion, the Court stated:
If for no other reason, the forfeiture is not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment because it involves neither two
criminal trials nor two criminal punishments. "Congress may impose
both a criminal and a civil sanction in respect to the same act or omission; for the double jeopardy clause prohibits merely punishing twice, or
attempting a second time to punish criminally, for the same offense."
409 U.S. at 235-36 (quoting Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938)). See
also United States v. One 1969 Buick Riviera Auto., 493 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1974).
127. Forfeiture is civil and remedial, and, as a result, its imposition is not
barred by an acquittal of criminal charges. 409 U.S. at 237.
128. Collateral estoppel is a doctrine which recognizes that the determination
of facts litigated between two parties in a proceeding is binding on those parties
in all future proceedings against each other. The constitutional prohibition
against double jeopardy includes within it the right of the defendant to plead
collateral estoppel. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 237 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
Collateral estoppel would bar a forfeiture if the elements of proof in the earlier criminal proceeding were the same elements of proof in the forfeiture proceeding. Most criminal charges require the government to prove that the act was
done with some requisite intent. This element of intent is usually absent from the
government's burden of proof in forfeiture proceedings. One Lot Emerald Cut
Stones, 409 U.S. at 234. See also Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970).
129. Forfeiture is a civil proceeding directed at the property, and the difference in the burden of proof in criminal and civil cases precludes application of the
doctrine of collateral estoppel. One Lot Emerald Cut Stones, 409 U.S. at 235.
130. The government's standard of proof in criminal proceedings is "beyond
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property is subject to forfeiture both in those cases where there
has been a prior conviction, and in those cases where there has
been a prior acquittal.131
SOURCES OF POSSIBLE RELIEF TO INNOCENT PARTIES

Although the Supreme Court has held that forfeiture statutes
could be constitutionally applied to the property interests of innocent parties,"' there are various ways in which an innocent party
can avoid forfeiture. Remedies-such as petitions for remission or
mitigation, 38 statutory provisions excluding innocent parties from
forfeiture, and relief under a state's constitution-are available in
some jurisdictions to the innocent party. When available, these
remedies have been successfully used to prevent forfeiture.
A. Legislative Relief
Some state legislatures, after realizing the harshness of forfeiture statutes when applied to innocent parties, have made provisions within the civil forfeiture statutes themselves for the interests of innocent 4 parties. For instance, an Alabama forfeiture
statute provides that it shall not apply to innocent parties nor dea reasonable doubt," while the government's standard of proof in forfeiture pro-

ceedings (a civil proceeding) is "a preponderance of the evidence." See Note, Forfeiture of Property Used in Connection with Criminal Acts, 25 WAYNE L. REV.

83, 87 (1978).

131. Since an acquittal on criminal charges may represent only an adjudication of insufficient proof to overcome all reasonable doubt of the accused's innocence, and does not constitute an adjudication on the preponderance-of-the-evidence burden applicable in civil proceedings, a criminal acquittal does not operate
as collateral estoppel on issues in a subsequent civil proceeding. One Lot Emerald
Cut Stones, 409 U.S. at 235. See, e.g., One Lot Emerald Cut Stones, where the
government failed to convict the defendant of smuggling, but was able to sustain
a civil forfeiture because of the lower standard of proof.
132. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 688.
133. These remedies are enacted by statute to allow an innocent party relief
from the possible forfeiture of his property. See infra note 138 and accompanying
text. Remission is a statutory procedure in which an innocent owner of property
subject to forfeiture may petition the prosecuting officials to dismiss the forfeiture
and return the property. The petition must set forth facts and circumstances
which prove that the owner was not involved in the criminal activity which resulted in the property's seizure. The remission of a forfeiture is an "act of grace,"
and is discretionary. See infra notes 138-50 and accompanying text.
134. For an example of a state statutory definition of innocent, see infra note
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stroy a valid lien on the forfeited property.3 5 Some courts have
construed this provision as imposing a burden upon the state to
show that the owner is not an innocent party before forfeiture will
be allowed." s6 Few jurisdictions have enacted this provision within
their forfeiture statutes, leaving the petition for remission or mitigation as the remedy most often sought by innocent parties."17
B.

Petitions for Remission or Mitigation

This remedy is usually established by statute, and although
most jurisdictions have enacted these statutes, the relief it affords
is usually limited and is not available in all situations."' In addi135. ALA. CODE § 20-2-93 (Supp. 1982) states as follows:
(a) The following are subject to forfeiture:
(5) All conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles or vessels, which are used
or intended for use to transport [or] in any manner to facilitate the
transportation for the purpose of sale or receipt of property described in
subdivisions (1) or (2) of this subsection; provided, however, that:'
b. No conveyance is subject to forfeiture under this section by reason of any act or omission established by the owner thereof to have
been committed or omitted without his knowledge or consent; and
c. A forfeiture of a conveyance encumbered by a bona fide security
interest is subject to the interest of the secured party if he neither
had knowledge of nor consented to the act or omission.
136. In the case of In re 1975 Pontiac Grand Prix, 374 So. 2d 1119 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1979), forfeiture of a vehicle was sought pursuant to a statute which
provided that it was not to apply to innocent parties nor to destroy any valid lien.
The court held that when the state seeks forfeiture of a vehicle operated by someone other than the owner, "it is incumbent upon the state to show that the owner
had knowledge, either expressed or implied, of the illegal use of his automobile."
Id. at 1121.
137. ."The remedy sought most often by innocent parties and lienholders who
have a property interest subject to forfeiture is the petition for remission or mitigation." Smith, Modern Forfeiture Law And Policy: A Proposalfor Reform, 19
WM. & MARY L. REV. 661, 671 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Smith, Modern
Forfeiture].
138. Since this remedy is established by statute, the relief available depends
upon the provisions of the remission statute available in the jurisdiction where
forfeiture is sought. An example of a state remission statute is ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
38, § 36-4 (1981) which provides:
§ 36-4. Remission by Attorney General. Whenever any owner of, or other
person interested in, a vessel, vehicle, or aircraft seized under the provisions of this Act files with the Attorney General before the sale or destruction of such vessel, vehicle, or aircraft, a petition for the remission
of such forfeiture the Attorney General if he finds that such forfeiture

[1983:3231

FORFEITURE AND INNOCENT PARTIES

tion, some statutes provide for relief to innocent owners only, excluding those with a security interest in the property from the
remedy."'9
Remission and mitigation statutes create an executive power
10
to relieve innocent parties from the harshness of forfeiture." This
grant of executive power to prevent the forfeiture of property be41
longing to an innocent party is entirely discretionary.1 Remitting
the forfeiture is an act of grace usually exercised by an :executive
officer' 42 as provided in the statute. ' Under certain circumstances, the executive officer or his delegate may mitigate the forfeiture instead of allowing full remission. This power is discretionary and may be used when the claimant has not met the minimum
conditions for remission, but other extenuating circumstances are
present."' Remission or mitigation does not have to be granted,
was incurred without willful negligence or without any intention on the
part of the owner of any person whose right, title or interest is of record
as described in Section 36-1, to violate the law, or finds-the existence of
such mitigating circumstances as to justify the remission of forfeiture,
may cause the same to be remitted upon such terms and conditions as he
deems reasonable and just, or order discontinuance of any forfeiture proceeding relating thereto.
In states such as Massachusetts, for example, remission is not granted to a
lienholder. See infra note 139 and accompanying text. Also, jurisdictions such as
Puerto Rico do not have any remission provisions.
139. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 94C, § 47(c)(3) (West 1972) provides in part:
"No conveyance shall be subject to forfeiture unless the owner thereof knew, or
should have known that such conveyance was used in and for the business of
unlawfully manufacturing, dispensing, or distributing controlled substances."
In Commonwealth v. One 1978 Ford Van, 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 880,
419 N.E.2d 1060 (1981), the court construed the meaning of "owner" in the above
statute, and determined that a lienholder was not an owner. Therefore, the
lienholder's security interest was forfeited.
140. In United States v. One 1961 Cadillac, 337 F.2d 730, 733 (6th Cir. 1964)
the court stated that the purpose of remission statutes was to grant executive
power to relieve against the harshness of forfeitures. The exercise of power is
committed to the discretion of the executive. Remitting the forfeiture is an act of
grace, and the courts do not have the jurisdiction to direct the action of the executive, even if he abuses his discretion.
141. Id.
142. In federal statutes, the executive officer is usually the Secretary of the
Treasury or his delegate. In state jurisdictions, it is usually the attorney general.
The executive officer will be specified in the remission statute.
143. See supra note 138.
144. See generally Smith, How To Prevent Federal Forfeiture in Criminal
Cases, 26 PRAC. LAW. 11, 18-19 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Smith, Prevent
Forfeiture].
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and courts are not given the power to review the decision, even if
the executive has abused his discretion.' "
The procedure for filing a petition for remission or mitigation
is very technical and sometimes confusing because of the number
of laws and regulations controlling these petitions. Most statutes
require that the petition contain the following items: " one, a complete description of the property, detailing the ownership interest
of the petitioner; two, a statement setting forth facts and circumstances which justify remission or mitigation; and three, documentary evidence supporting the petitioner's claim. The petition must
be sworn to and filed with the proper executive within the time
allowed by the remission or mitigation statute. "" Remission will be
allowed only when there is no possibility that the owner was involved in the underlying crime.148 In addition, the filing of a petition for remission or mitigation presumes a valid forfeiture and, if
the petition is rejected, the claimant is precluded from challenging
the forfeiture on constitutional or other grounds.1 4 In deciding
which remedy to seek, the innocent party must remember that
once he elects remission or mitigation, he is then precluded from
seeking other relief.18 0
C. Judicial Relief
In the absence of a remission or mitigation statute applicable
to the innocent party's situation, other legal defenses have been
recognized by various courts as a means of avoiding forfeiture. The
government's failure to promptly institute proceedings after the
seizure of property was held to preclude, forfeiture in Boston v.
Stephens.51 In Boston, a used sports car dealer had his property
seized by customs officers when it was believed that five cars
145. The legislature in enacting the remission provision grants the executive
branch sole jurisdiction to permit remission or mitigation. The courts are not

granted authority to review the executive's decision, See supra note 140.
146. Smith, Prevent Forfeiture,supra note 144, at 17-18.

147. In addition to meeting the statutory requirements of the remission peti-

tion, administrative regulations set by the executive granting remission must also
be complied with.
148. Smith, Prevent Forfeiture, supra note 144, at 19.
149. Smith, Modern Forfeiture, supra note 137, at 671.

150. However, it might be possible for the claimant to file his petition, have

it rejected, and then raise a constitutional challenge. See Simons v. United States,
497 F.2d 1046 (9th Cir. 1974); cf. Jaekel v. United States, 304 F. Supp. 993

(S.D.N.Y. 1969).

151. 395 F. Supp. 1000 (S.D. Ohio 1975).
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owned by the dealer were in violation of federal exhaust emission
standards. 6 The seized cars were retained by customs officers for
a period of six months before the matter was finally referred to a
United States Attorney for the purpose of instituting forfeiture
proceedings against the property.153 The dealer argued that the delay in instituting forfeiture proceedings, while the government retained possession of this property, was unreasonable and, that as a
result, he was deprived of his property without due process of
law. 154 The court agreed and held that the cars must be returned to
the dealer because the delay by the government had rendered forfeiture of the property constitutionally impermissible.' In reaching its decision in Boston, the court specifically found that neither
the dealer, nor his attorney had contributed to the government's
unnecessary delay, 15
In Moore v. Timmerman,1 57 the Supreme Court of South Carolina refused to apply a forfeiture statute to an innocent owner.
After examining the statutes at issue, 5 s the court declared that
152. It was contended by the government that the dealer made certain false
statements to customs officials that the vehicles in question did comply with the
EPA exhaust standards. Seizure of the vehicles was authorized by 19 U.S.C. §
1602, which provided for the seizure of merchandise when there is a violation of
the customs law. 395 F. Supp. at 1002.
153. The government contended that the delay was necessary for purposes of
conducting an investigation of the customs violation. 395 F. Supp. at 1003.
154. The court, in reaching its decision, referred to the case of United States
v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971), and stated that the decision in
Thirty-seven Photographs imposed a requirement upon seizing officers to
promptly report the seizure of property to U.S. Attorneys. 395 F. Supp. at 100203.
155. The court stated that the delay in instituting forfeiture proceedings deprived the property owner of his property without due process of law, and that
because the owner had been denied this constitutional right, forfeiture could not
take place. The cars were ordered to be returned to the owner. 395 F. Supp. at
1003. For other decisions which have held that the due process clause requires the
government to commence the forfeiture proceeding within a reasonable period after seizure, see United States v. Eight (8) Rhodesian Stone Statues, 449 F. Supp.
193 (C.D. Cal. 1978); United States v. One 1970 Ford Pickup, 564 F.2d 864 (9th
Cir. 1977); United States v. One (1) Douglas A-26B Aircraft, 436 F. Supp. 1292
(S.D. Ga. 1977); Sarkisian v. United States, 472 F.2d 468 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 976 (1973).
156. Had the owner or his counsel been responsible for the delay, forfeiture
would probably have been allowed. Boston, 395 F. Supp. at 1003.
157. 276 S.C. 104, 276 S.E.2d 290 (1981).
158. S.C. CODE ANN § 50-11-2090 (Law. Co-op. 1976) provides in part as
follows:
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only the property belonging to a criminal defendant would be subject to forfeiture. The decision in Moore was based on the notice
requirements set forth in the statute. 5 9 Notice of the forfeiture
was to be either by posting or publication. The court reasoned that
only those who were criminal defendants would be provided with
notice and an opportunity to be heard.8 0 In its opinion, the court
allowed for the possibility of forfeiting an innocent owner's property, but implied that before forfeiture could take place, personal
notice and an opportunity to be heard would be necessary.''
D.

Calero-Toledo Exceptions

In the absence of a remission or mitigation statute, the defense asserted most often by innocent parties against the forfeiture
of their property is the same one asserted by the property owner in
Calero-Toledo; that is, forfeiture when applied to an innocent
party constitutes a taking of property without due process of law.
After the decision in Calero-Toledo, some courts started to recogEvery vehicle, boat, animal and firearm used in the hunting of deer at
night is hereby declared forfeited to the State and shall be confiscated by
any peace officer, who shall forthwith deliver it to the Director of the
Division of Game or his duly authorized agent.
Section 50-11-2100 provides in part:
The Director or his authorized agent shall sell any such vehicle,
boat, animal or firearm at public auction for cash to the highest bidder in
front of the county courthouse in the county where it is confiscated, after
having given ten days' public notice of such sale 'by posting advertisement thereof on the door or bulletin board of the county courthouse or
by publishing such advertisement at least'once in a newspaper of general
circulation in such county.
159. Id. § 50-11-2100.
160. Since the notice provision in the statute did not allow for a hearing prior
to the sale of the property, innocent owners could be deprived of their property
without even knowing that it had been seized. However, those who were criminal
defendants would be aware of the seizure and therefore had an opportunity to
protest the seizure prior to sale. In holding that the statute as applied to an innocent owner deprived him of due process of law, the' court in Moore stated: "A
statute or ordinance which allows the seizure and confiscation of a person's property by ministerial officers without inquiry before a court or an opportunity of
being heard in his own defense is a violation of the elementary principles of law
and the constitution." 276 S.E.2d at 293.
161. The court implied that if the statutes had provided the proper notice
and an opportunity for a hearing prior to the sale then forfeiture would be allowed. Citing Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. 663, the court stated that forfeiture is not
necessarily protected merely because the property is owned by an innocent third
party. 276 S.E.2d at 293.
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nize the owner's constitutional arguments as being valid and applied one of the two exceptions 162 recognized in Calero-Toledo to
prevent forfeiture: one, where the property had been taken without
the owner's consent; and two, where the owner was able to prove
that he had done all that reasonably could be expected to prevent
the illegal use of his property." 3
In United States v. One 1976 Chevrolet Corvette,6 4 a car that
had been used in an illegal narcotics transaction was later sold to
an innocent purchaser. 165 Although the purchaser neither had been
involved in nor was aware of the illegal activity, the government
still sought forfeiture of the car.' 66 In holding that forfeiture of the
innocent purchaser's car would constitute an unconstitutional deprivation of property, the court cited one of the exceptions set forth
in Calero-Toledo167 and stated that in this circumstance, it would
be difficult to conclude that forfeiture served legitimate purposes
and was not unduly oppressive."6
However, in Commonwealth v. One 1978 Ford Van,1' 9 the possible exceptions set forth in Calero-Toledo were not applied to an
innocent lienholder who had done all that could reasonably be expected to prevent misuse of the van.17 0 The court reasoned that the
162. See supra text accompanying note 108.
163. The Calero-Toledo Court stated that it would be difficult to reject the
constitutional claim of the owner who could prove that he came within the scope
of one of these two exceptions. 416 U.S. at 689.
164. 477 F. Supp. 32 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
165. Two weeks after its use in a narcotics transaction the car was sold to an
innocent purchaser who had no knowledge of its use in the illegal transaction. 477
F. Supp. at 34-35.
166. The government contended that the car was subject to forfeiture since it
was used in connection with illegal activity. The government also contended that
the decision in Calero-Toledo allowed an in rem forfeiture of the vehicle even
though the vehicle's current owner may be innocent of any wrongful conduct. 477
F. Supp. at 34.
167. See supra text accompanying note 108.
168. Citing Calero-Toledo, the court stated:
Simply put, the defendant vehicle was not claimant's property at the
time it was put to an illegal use, nor did she at the time exercise any
control over it. We have found that claimant proved that she purchased
defendant vehicle in a bona fide transaction after its illegal use and that
she was innocent of any knowledge of or involvement with the illegal use.
In this peculiar factual situation, "it would be difficult to conclude that
forfeiture [serves] legitimate purposes and [is] not unduly oppressive."
477 F. Supp. at 35 (quoting Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 689-90).
169. 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 880, 419 N.E.2d 1060 (1981).
170. 419 N.E.2d at 1061. Ford Motor Credit as the lienholder was completely

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

lienholder, a sizeable commercial financing house, must have taken
into account the occasional loss of a security interest to forfeiture,
and held that forfeiture of the security interest was con-

stitutional.

71

E. State Constitution as a Basis for Relief
The two cases outlined above illustrate the difficulty courts
have had defining the possible exceptions to forfeiture as set forth
in Calero-Toledo. This difficulty has led some courts to examine
the forfeiture procedure with regard to state constitutional rights.
One such court was the Alaska Supreme Court in State v. Rice.' 7 2
In Rice, a lienholder's security interest in an airplane was forfeited
because the plane was used by its owner to transport a moose
killed in violation of Alaska's game regulations. 7 ' The lienholder
unaware of the owner's illegal use of the van, and prior to transferring title to the
owner, Ford had conducted an investigation of the owner's credit which did not
reveal any derogatory information about him. In addition, the owner was required
to sign the installment sale contract which provided that he was not to use the
vehicle for any illegal purpose. Id.
171. Id. at 1064-65. Since the forfeiture statute at issue in this case did not
provide for remission of a lienholder's interest if the owner used the property
illegally, (see supra note 139 and accompanying text), the court charged Ford
with this knowledge and determined that Ford must have taken into account the
occasional loss of a security interest to forfeiture when it made the loan. In addition, the court stated that Ford was not without a remedy since the forfeiture
would not extinguish the underlying debt which remains enforceable against the
maker of the note and any endorsers. Id. at 1064.
172. 626 P.2d 104 (Alaska 1981).
173. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, § 81.070(b) (1973) provides in part:
b) The illegal methods and means of taking big game... are
(6) a person who has been airborne may not thereafter take or assist in
taking big game until after 3:00 a.m. following the day ir which the flying
occurred.
ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, § 81.140(b) (1973) provides:
No person may possess or transport any game or parts of game illegally
taken.
ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.195 (1977) provides in part:
Forfeiture of equipment. (a) Guns, traps, nets, fishing gear, vessels, aircraft, other motor vehicles, sleds, and other paraphernalia or gear used in
or in aid of a violation of this title, or a regulation promulgated under
this title . . . may be forfeited to the state . ..
(2) upon judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction in a proceeding in
rem that an item specified above was used in or in aid of a violation of
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argued that a strict application of the civil forfeiture statute,
without first allowing innocent parties the opportunity to show

that they had not been involved in the criminal activity that triggered the forfeiture,
violated the state's constitutional due process
17 4
provision.

The court agreed and held that substantive due process under
the Alaska Constitution required that forfeited property be remitted if the innocent party can show: the manner in which the property came into possession of such other person; and that prior to
parting with the property the innocent party did not know, nor
have reasonable cause to believe, either that the property would be
used to violate the law, or that the violator had a criminal record
or reputation for crime. 17 5 The case was then remanded with orders that if the lienholder could make the requisite showing, it was
entitled to reimbursement from the state for its security interest in
76
the forfeited property.

In contrast, the court in Louisiana v. 1971 Green GMC Van'7
did not impose any requirement of proof upon the innocent party.
The court reasoned that because forfeiture statutes are penal in
nature, due process would not allow an innocent person to be penalized for an offense which he did not commit, and of which he
had absolutely no knowledge. 7 Additionally and independently,
civil forfeiture statutes as applied to innocent parties were held to
violate the right to property guaranteed by Louisiana's con79
stitution.

this title or a regulation promulgated under it.
174. Citing previous cases, the court noted that under the Alaska Constitution: "[s]ubstantive due process is denied when a legislative enactment has no
reasonable relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose." 626 P.2d at 110
(footnote omitted).
175. Rice, 626 P.2d 114. In agreeing with the lender, that forfeiture when
applied to an innocent lienholder failed to serve a "legitimate governmental purpose," the court noted that forfeiture in this instance would not serve the purpose
of punishing the wrongdoer, nor prevent the further illegal use of the property. Id.
176. Id. at 114-15. See also Note, Aircraft Forfeiture-IllegalActivities, 47
J. AIR. L. & CoM. 385 (1982).
177. 354 So. 2d 479 (La. 1977).
178. Since other state statutes require a criminal conviction before punishment can occur, the court determined that forfeiture statutes must also require a
criminal conviction before the punishment of forfeiture can occur. 354 So. 2d at
485.
179. LA. CONST. art. I, § 4 provides in part:
Every person has the right to acquire, own, control, use, enjoy, protect,
and dispose of private property. This right is subject to reasonable statu-
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As one can see from the decisions involving forfeiture of property belonging to innocent parties, there are no set standards by
which courts have been able to provide for the interests of innocent parties whose property has been involved in criminal activity.
Some courts have recognized the harshness of forfeiture and provided relief to the innocent, while other courts continue to strictly
apply forfeiture statutes, depriving innocent persons of their property. Additionally, even when the rights of the innocent are recognized, the relief available is not uniform from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. However, as one can ascertain from the cases discussed in
this comment, it appears that the trend is to allow the innocent
party some type of relief from forfeiture.
CONCLUSION

Forfeiture does serve a purpose-it removes from society those
items classified as contraband per se, that by their nature are dangerous and harmful to others. In addition, forfeiture statutes serve
the purpose of punishing present wrongdoers, deterring future
wrongdoers, and providing revenue to the government. When forfeiture is applied to an innocent party, only revenue is gained. The
benefit of this revenue is small when it is compared with the enormous disenchantment these innocent citizens have with their government and judicial system. Laws which inflict punishment on innocent persons are contrary to the fundamental notion, dating
back as far as the law of deodands, that the guilty shall be punished while the innocent shall be protected. 8 0
It is time to discard civil forfeiture's notion that property can
commit an illegal act and put forfeiture in its proper context-as a
punishment to those that commit illegal acts, and as a means of
protecting society by removing dangerous items that have no social
tory restrictions and the reasonable exercise of the police power.
Personal effects, other than contraband, shall never be taken.
The court held that forfeiture when applied to an innocent owner violated this
provision of the constitution because it is an unreasonable restriction on the right
to property. 354 So. 2d at 486.
180. See supra notes 22-29 and accompanying text. Deodands served the
purpose of compensating the wrong that the offending res had done. In addition,
when there was no other remedy available, deodands served to punish the owner

of the offending res for his negligence, and removed the offending res from society. Hence, in the 18th and 19th centuries, deodands served a purpose and did
not punish totally innocent persons.
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utility. Property itself does not commit illegal acts; people commit
illegal acts. Therefore, a proper solution would be to apply civil
forfeiture actions only to contraband per se and to characterize all
other forfeitures as criminal in nature, imposing a requirement of
mens rea or scienter on the part of the owner. By making forfeiture
a criminal proceeding, the burden of proof would be on the state to
prove its right to the property by first establishing that the owner
of the property was guilty of the criminal offense "beyond a reasonable doubt." Making forfeiture a criminal proceeding would
also ensure the owner of all the constitutional safeguards which attach to a criminal action, including fourth amendment guarantees
against the illegal seizure of property. It is only reasonable to allow
the owner of property used in the commission of an illegal act the
same protections as those given to the person who committed the
illegal act.
A clear, reasonable, and fair approach to forfeiture is needed,
or we will forever be mired in the remains of the feudal law of
deodands. By applying civil forfeitures only to contraband per se
and characterizing all other forfeitures as criminal, the guilty will
be punished and the innocent will be protected.
DENNIS

R. HEWITT

